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Compulsory Care-giving: Some Thoughts on Relational 
Feminism, the Ethics of Care and Omissions Liability 
 
Neil Cobb, Durham Law School 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the course of their university education every law student can expect to 
grapple with the rules governing criminal liability for omissions.1 The assertion 
that, presumptively, a criminal offence must be committed by an act, and the 
associated reluctance to prohibit failures to act in all but exceptional 
circumstances, is a jurisprudential principle crafted and clarified by a line of 
eminent, and male, jurists in the United Kingdom (from Lord Macaulay2 and 
Sir James Stephens3 in the nineteenth century to Glanville Williams4 and Lord 
Diplock5 in the late twentieth) in vivid and often colourful prose.6 On the other 
hand, there has been a noticeable dearth of literature considering the 
gendered implications of this conventional account of omissions liability.7 It 
might seem quite understandable to some that this particular aspect of 
criminal theory has previously failed to attract feminist critique; the concept 
has little apparent significance in the criminal law‟s well-documented 
contribution to women‟s historic and contemporary disadvantage. However, I 
want to suggest, alternatively, that it can be seen to go to the heart of recent 
theorising about gender, particularly the work of relational or „difference‟ 
feminists, if one considers its role in law‟s discursive construction, and 
material regulation, of care-giving.8 In this article I shall draw briefly upon the 
insights of relational feminist jurisprudence in order to provide a preliminary 
re-reading of the theory and practice of omissions liability. While accepting 
postmodern feminist concerns with the apparently essential feminine voice 
often claimed to underpin relational theory, I would still assert the value of 
interrogating the approach to criminal omissions (partly inspired, some might 
argue, by masculine anxieties) from the perspective of the ethics of care. 
 
The article has three parts. The first part reconsiders feminist legal theory and 
its critique of law and, in doing so, sets out a series of concerns with the 
criminal process: its role in the continued material violence against women; 
                                                 
1
 Although, of course, the issue of omissions liability also arises in tort law and theory: see B. 
Markensinis and S. Deakin, Tort Law (Oxford: OUP, 1999), pp.137-142. 
2
 T. Macaulay, Notes on the Indian Penal Code in Lady Trevelyan (ed) Miscellaneous Works 
of Lord Macaulay (New York: Harper, 1880). 
3
 J. Stephens, Digest of the Criminal Law (London: Macmillan, 1877). 
4
 G. Williams, „Criminal Omissions – the Conventional View‟ (1991) Law Quarterly Review 86. 
5
 Miller [1983] 2 AC 161. 
6
 See below, nn. 25 and 31. 
7
 An exception is Herring‟s recent article on the particular gendered impact of section 5 of the 
Domestic Violence, Victims and Crime Act 2004 which, he notes, tends to criminalise women 
whose failure to take steps to protect their children from harm by a partner is often the result 
of domestic violence: see J. Herring, 'Familial Homicide, Failure to Protect and Domestic 
Violence: Who's the Victim?' [2007] Crim LR 923. 
8
 C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982). 
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the oppressive potential of its discursive construction of women; and the 
gendered structure of legal reasoning and adjudication. In the second part, I 
reconsider the classic debates over the duty of (easy) rescue. I ask whether 
the historic refusal of the common law to countenance such a duty, at least 
within the Anglo-American legal tradition, reflects to some extent the 
prioritisation of an ethics of justice over an ethics of care in legal reasoning, 
arguably derived from overwhelming masculine anxieties about the prospect 
of annihilation at the hands of the other.9 Nevertheless, the article goes on to 
advise that relational feminists exercise caution before seeking to enforce 
care-giving towards strangers by criminal sanction, before highlighting 
possible feminist concerns with the rules of omissions liability already in place.   
 
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY AND THE ETHICS OF CARE 
 
Feminist legal theory consists of an array of complex, heterogeneous 
analytical positions, reflecting the variety of perspectives found within the 
broader feminist movement.10 Nevertheless, to my mind Joanne Conoghan‟s 
recent summary of its key characteristics provides a useful starting-point:  
 
First, feminist legal scholars seek to highlight and explore the gendered content of law 
and to probe characterizations positing themselves as neutral and, more specifically, 
ungendered. Secondly, they are part of a cross-disciplinary feminist effort to challenge 
traditional understandings of the social, legal, cultural, and epistemological order by 
placing women, their individual and shared experiences, at the centre of their 
scholarship. Thirdly, feminist legal scholars seek to track and expose law‟s implication 
in women‟s disadvantage with a view to bringing about transformative social and 
political change.
11
  
 
What, though, is meant by the gendered content of law and, more specifically, 
the criminal law? Particular criminal laws tend to attract the interest of 
feminists because of their direct material impact upon women (for example, 
the law of rape), or their negative discursive constructions of women (for 
instance, the partial defences to murder and battered women who kill). 
Importantly, however, feminist scholarship also recognises that “there is 
something not merely about particular laws or sets of laws, but rather, and 
more generally, about the very structure or method of modern law, which is 
hierarchically gendered”.12 The rules on omissions liability, as I shall try to 
show, have gendered implications, potentially, on each of these grounds. 
 
In doing so, I want to reconsider in this article the legal rules governing 
omissions liability in the United Kingdom in light of one particular stream of 
feminist legal theorising, relational or „difference‟ feminism, developed most 
recently in the 1980s primarily by psychologist Carol Gilligan and, in the legal 
                                                 
9
 Of course, the countries of continental Europe have been much more willing to impose 
criminal law duties to rescue: see, for instance, A. Ashworth and E. Steiner, „Criminal 
Omissions and Public Duties: the French Experience‟ (1990) 10 Legal Studies 153. 
10
 J. Conoghan, „Reassessing the Feminist Theoretical Project in Law (2000) 27(3) Journal of 
Law and Society 351, pp. 357-358. 
11
 Ibid, p.359. See, also, the feminist legal methodology set out in K. T. Bartlett, „Feminist 
Legal Method‟ (1970) 103 Harvard Law Review 829. 
12
 N. Lacey, Unspeakable Subjects: Feminist Essays in Legal and Social Theory (Oxford: 
Hart, 1998), p. 2.  
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sphere, the scholarship of Robin West.13 Difference feminism grew up in 
contradistinction to earlier feminisms that denied the existence of meaningful 
differences grounded in sex and gender as part of the struggle for formal 
equality for women. Instead, difference feminists argued that important social 
distinctions do exist between men and women, deriving particularly from 
women‟s experience of maternity and child rearing, and that these differences 
must be recognised if women‟s disadvantage is to be effectively addressed. In 
turn, cultural feminists asserted further the positive contribution of women‟s 
idiosyncratic approach to moral reasoning while highlighting what they saw as 
the patriarchal ethics of a society administered by men for their own benefit.  
 
Cultural feminists worked thereafter to promulgate a specifically feminine 
ethics of care emphasising (in law and elsewhere) the value of relational 
modes of moral reasoning, which better reflected the interdependency of 
women‟s material and existential lives. For Gilligan and later theorists, while  
 
men tend to embrace an ethic of rights using quasi-legal terminology and impartial 
principles … women tend to affirm an ethic of care that centers on responsiveness in an 
interconnected network of needs, care, and prevention of harm. Taking care of others is 
the core notion.
14
  
 
This idea of a feminine ethics of care not only celebrated previously ignored or 
devalued characteristics traditionally attributed to women, but also promised   
 
a vision of human relationships and of society grounded upon the primacy of human 
connectedness, wherein care and compassion are seen as fundamental and where 
emotions, peaceful co-operation, empathy, friendship and responsibility are aspired to 
rather than universal, abstract, rational principles (autonomy, freedom, justice, equality 
and rights).
15
 
 
Accordingly, many feminist scholars excitedly began to develop and invoke an 
ethics of care in pursuit of a utopian feminine vision for societal organisation.16  
 
I want to pick up on two applications of the ethics of care to legal studies in 
particular. First of all, feminist legal scholars quickly positioned the ethics of 
care in opposition to the contemporary liberal legal order and the significance 
it places upon individuality and detachment. For instance, Robin West has 
argued powerfully that the “official story” of liberal legalism is defined by men‟s 
experience of material and existential separation, their desire to protect that 
autonomy and, more importantly, their unshakeable fear of impending 
annihilation by the other.17 For West, this “separation thesis” explains why law 
                                                 
13
 C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); R. 
West, „The Difference in Women‟s Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist 
Legal Theory‟ (1987) 81(3) Wisconsin Women’s Law Journal 81; R. West, „Jurisprudence and 
Gender‟ (1988) 55(1) University of Chicago Law Review 1; R. West, Caring For Justice (New 
York: NYU Press, 1997). 
14
 T. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (New York: OUP 
USA, 2001), p. 371. 
15
 M. Drakapololou, „The Ethic of Care, Female Subjectivity and Feminist Legal Scholarship‟ 8 
(2000) Feminist Legal Studies 199, pp. 204-5. 
16
 See for example, V. Held, The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political and Global (Oxford: OUP, 
2005) and M. A. Slote, The Ethics of Care and Empathy (London: Routledge, 2007). 
17
 R. West, „Jurisprudence and Gender‟ (1988) 55(1) University of Chicago Law Review 1. 
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remains so desperately protective of individual autonomy. It is also important, 
secondly, to recognise the challenge posed by the ethics of care to the central 
role of impartiality within this asserted patriarchal jurisprudence. Relational 
feminists have observed that both Kantian and utilitarian ethics demand, in 
the pursuit of fairness, that we treat human beings as indistinguishable from 
one another. They then point out that in doing so these ethics obfuscate the 
reality that human beings invariably hold specific prior ties with particular 
people; relationships that hold individual meaning for us and our identities.18 
 
For some feminists, however, particularly those who subscribe to a 
postmodern and poststructuralist understanding of women‟s oppression, the 
ethics of care has proven extremely problematic. In its claims about the 
existence of essential femininity it threatens to mask both the difference 
between women on grounds of race, class and sexuality and the possibility 
that psychology is socially constructed rather than biologically foundational.19 
Perhaps most importantly, as feminist legal scholar Drucilla Cornell observes,  
 
essentialist or naturalist theories of the feminine have been ethically and politically 
condemned for providing a new justification for the old stereotypes, even if those 
stereotypes are now supposedly being used to affirm the feminine.
20
 
 
As someone sympathetic to poststructuralist concerns,21 I am conscious of 
the dangers inherent in the naturalist claims about the voice of the essential 
women. Indeed, I consider later in this article how the association of women 
with an ethics of care by feminist can reinforce gendered stereotypes that 
themselves contribute themselves to women‟s oppression. Nevertheless, I 
remain open here to the political potential of an ethics of care, de-coupled 
from essentialist, biological explanations of women‟s nature, as a competing 
vision for moral reasoning in legal theory. In addition, whatever one concludes 
about women‟s natural nurturing capabilities, one must at least be prepared to 
recognise that they remain disproportionately responsible for care-giving. 
 
Feminist legal scholars have drawn upon the ethics of care in various contexts 
to challenge what they view as the “inappropriately atomistic vision of the 
social world” evoked by the contemporary liberal legal order.22 Nicola Lacey 
has concluded, however, that “[i]nterestingly, this is a less salient feature of 
criminal law than of, say, contract law; criminal law is, after all, in the business 
                                                 
18
 Ibid, pp. 13-14. 
19
 L. Alcoff, „Cultural Feminism versus Post-Structuralism: the Identity Crisis in Feminist 
Theory‟ (1988) 13(3) Signs 405; V. Taylor and L. Rupp, „Women's Culture and Lesbian 
Feminist Activism: A Reconsideration of Cultural Feminism‟ (1993) 19(1) Signs 32. For a 
poststructuralist challenge to the legal theory of Robin West, see K. Sheehan, „Caring for 
Deconstruction‟ (2000) 12 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 85. 
20
 D. Cornell, Beyond Accommodation: Ethical Feminism, Deconstruction and the Law 
(London: Routledge, 1991), p. 33. 
21
 N. Cobb, „”Gay Couple‟s Break Like Fawlty Towers”: Dangerous Representations of 
Lesbian and Gay Oppression in an Era of “Progressive” Law Reform‟ (2009) 18(3) Social and 
Legal Studies (forthcoming). 
22
 N. Lacey, „General Principles of Criminal Law? A Feminist View‟ in D. Nicolson and L. 
Bibbings, Feminist Perspectives on Criminal Law (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 94. For a 
recent thoughtful reappraisal of the relevance of Gilligan‟s work for feminist legal scholarship, 
see E. Rackley, „From Arachne to Charlotte: An Imaginative Revisiting of Gilligan‟s In A 
Different Voice (2007) 13(3) William & Mary Journal of Women and the Law 751. 
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of articulating reciprocal responsibilities”.23 Perhaps this is true (although 
Lacey seems to ignore the important point that the criminal law does more 
than merely articulate responsibilities; it imposes them).24 Nevertheless, for 
me omissions liability is a conceptual element of the general principles of 
criminal law that is, in fact, ripe for reconsideration through the lens of the 
feminist ethics of care. To my mind the jurisprudence in this area is 
concerned, at its core, with the extent of the care-giving responsibilities we 
owe to other people and the extent to which law, as a disciplinary system, can 
and should be utilised to enforce such responsibilities. To support this claim, I 
want to reconsider, in the first part of the following analysis, the perennial 
jurisprudential debate over the hypothetical criminal law duty of (easy) rescue. 
 
MASCULINE ANXIETIES: AUTONOMY, ANNIHILATION AND THE 
„DROWNING STRANGER‟ 
 
Jurisprudential debates over the legitimacy of omissions liability have tended 
to crystallise around the duty of (easy) rescue. The Anglo-American legal 
tradition, unlike its European continental counterpart, has refused historically 
to recognise an enforceable responsibility of this kind. Lord Diplock has made 
the most recent and memorable judicial statement to this effect in his opinion 
in Miller drawing (as so many other commentators have) upon the Christian 
parable of the Good Samaritan to reinforce his point.25 However, the classic 
exposition of what Andrew Ashworth describes as „the conventional view‟26 of 
criminal omissions is of course found in Stephen‟s Digest of Criminal Law:  
 
A sees B drowning and is able to save him by holding out his hand. A abstains from 
doing so in order that B may be drowned, and B is drowned. A has committed no 
offence.
27
  
 
Reluctance to criminalise even easy and deliberately harmful failures to 
rescue stems from the explicit assertion that offences of this kind are an 
unjustifiable incursion into individual autonomy.28 In the words of Wilson,  
 
punishing omissions … seems to compromise rather than enhance human freedom and 
autonomy since it makes demands of us which may require us to subjugate our own 
interests to those of others. … [Such a duty] is apt to stigmatise the very people which 
liberal society cherishes – those who go around minding their own business and whose 
destiny is to leave no kind of mark on society let alone a bloody one
 
.
29
  
                                                 
23
 Ibid, p. 94.  
24
 Compare, for example, in the contract field, L. Mulcahy, „The Limitations of Love and 
Altruism – Feminist Perspectives on Contract Law‟ in L. Mulcahy and S. Wheeler,  Feminist 
Perspectives on Contract Law (London: Glasshouse, 2005), pp. 1-19. 
25
 In the words of Lord Diplock, “The conduct of the parabolical priest and Levite on the road 
to Jericho may have been indeed deplorable, but English law has not so far developed to the 
state of treating it as criminal”: Miller [1983] 2 AC 161, p. 175. 
26
 A. Ashworth, „The Scope of Criminal Liability for Omissions‟ (1989) 84 Law Quarterly 
Review 424, pp. 427-430.  
27
 J. Stephens, Digest of the Criminal Law (London: Macmillan, 1877), p.135.  
28
 Note, though, that arguments derived from claims of autonomy are not the only criticisms 
levelled at omissions liability. For instance, William Wilson identifies contemporary objections 
grounded in autonomy, legality and fair labelling: see W. Wilson, Central Issues in Criminal 
Theory (Oxford: Hart, 2002), pp. 91-102.  
29
 W. Wilson, Central Issues in Criminal Theory (Oxford: Hart, 2002), pp. 91 and 94. 
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Critics conclude that while causing harm by one‟s actions is justifiably the 
subject of criminal prohibition, failing to prevent harm is not.30 
 
An important observation by those liberals opposed to duties to rescue is that, 
unlike other forms of liability, they would work to restrict an individual‟s 
autonomy unpredictably: arising without warning should an individual actually 
stumble across the hypothetical drowning stranger. What I find particularly 
interesting about the historic jurisprudence in this area, however, is that these 
fears about freedom seem to extend psychically far deeper. In his Notes on 
the Indian Penal Code, first published in 1864, Lord Macaulay provides one of 
the classic expositions of the conventional view. Explaining the decision by 
the framers of the Code to preclude liability for failing to rescue a stranger in 
danger, he concludes: 
 
We are sensible that in some of the cases which we have put, our rule may appear too 
lenient; but we do not think that it can be made more severe without disturbing the 
whole order of society. It is true that the man who, having abundance of wealth, suffers 
a fellow creature to die of hunger at his feet, is a bad man, a worse man, probably, than 
many of those for whom we have provided very severe punishment. But we are unable 
to see where, if we make such a man legally punishable, we can draw the line.
31
 
 
Concern with line-drawing between acceptable and unacceptable failures to 
rescue continues to this day. Implicit is a fear of incursion into individual 
autonomy far beyond the time and energy expended upon a particular rescue. 
Macaulay reveals a broader anxiety that law‟s claim to rationality and 
impartiality brings with it an apocalyptic vision of economic and class 
revolution stemming inevitably from that first simple demand that we care. 
 
This powerful construction of the autonomous, unconnected individual 
permanently threatened by annihilation seems to accord well with the 
masculine imperatives underpinning the legal order identified by relational 
feminists, particularly Robin West. It might be tempting to conclude, then, that 
the refusal to impose a duty of easy rescue reflects the lack of value placed 
upon an ethics of care within the liberal legal order. Our patriarchal legal 
system, one might argue, just doesn‟t care about the drowning stranger; if it 
did, it would be willing to impose a duty of (easy) rescue. However, to do so 
                                                 
30
 For a classic exposition of this view see G. Williams, „Criminalising Omissions – The 
Conventional View‟ (1989) 86 Law Quarterly Review 88. See, also, A. Leavens, „A Causation 
Approach to Criminal Omissions‟ (1988) 76 California Law Review 547. 
31
 T. Macaulay, Notes on the Indian Penal Code in Lady Trevelyan (ed) Miscellaneous Works 
of Lord Macaulay (New York, Harper: 1880), pp. 254-255. In another, perhaps more famous 
passage, Macaulay contends: “It will hardly be maintained that a surgeon ought to be treated 
as a murderer for refusing to go from Calcutta to Meerut to perform an operation, although it 
should be absolutely certain that this surgeon was the only person in India who could perform 
it, and that if it were not performed, the person who required it would die. It is difficult to say 
whether a penal code which should put no omissions on the same footing with acts, or a 
penal code which should put all omissions on the same footing as acts, would produce 
consequences more absurd and revolting … Indeed, it is hard to conceive how, if either were 
adopted, society could be held together.”: T. Macaulay, Notes on the Indian Penal Code in 
Lady Trevelyan (ed) Miscellaneous Works of Lord Macaulay (New York, Harper: 1880), p. 
252 (my emphasis). 
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would, in my view, reflect a failure to consider the subtleties of this 
jurisprudence. The value of care-giving is, in fact, consistently emphasised. 
 
As Alan Norrie notes, “it is not commonly argued that the easy rescue case is 
defensible in terms of what is socially proper or expected”.32 Indeed, judicial 
pronouncements on the subject have been described as “deliberately 
provocative”.33 A‟s specifically intentional effort to allow B to die in Stephen‟s 
example, and the ease with which he could carry out the rescue, certainly 
suggests a desire to emphasis the moral rectitude of the former‟s behaviour. 
On occasion the stranger is specifically identified as a child in an apparent 
effort to emphasise the distinction between obviously unethical behaviour and 
the appropriate ambit of the criminal law, while jurists tend to go out of their 
way to condemn the conduct. In short, the paradigm “drives a wedge between 
the commonsense expectation or evaluation of what constitutes an omission 
and the law‟s conception of the same”.34 Underpinning preclusion of liability in 
this context is the belief that an ethical project of this kind is inappropriately 
imposed using the machinery of the criminal law, rather than an assertion that 
we owe no such ethical duty toward our fellow human beings in practice. 
 
Additionally (as every law student also knows) the „conventional view‟ of 
omissions liability is only one such vision to be found within the contemporary 
liberal legal order. Andrew Ashworth is just one liberal commentator in recent 
years to propose a competing „social responsibility view‟ that, among other 
things, advocates the imposition of a duty of easy rescue.35 This perspective 
derives from the assertion that individual autonomy cannot be achieved 
without reliance upon other human beings: “[t]he foundation of the argument 
is that a level of social co-operation and social responsibility is both good and 
necessary for the realisation of individual autonomy”.36 It appears, then, that 
the contemporary jurisprudence developed in relation to the hypothetical duty 
of easy rescue already incorporates a line of argument that might satisfy the 
ethics of care.37 Put another way, even if the United Kingdom does not as yet 
formally sanction those who fail to engage in positive care-giving towards 
strangers, to impose such a responsibility is at least a comprehensible 
conclusion within the philosophical parameters of the criminal law.  
 
What, then, can the feminist ethics of care really contribute to this debate, if 
liberal jurisprudence has already framed the issue as one of balance between 
                                                 
32
 A. Norrie, Crime, Reason and History (Cambridge, CUP, 2001), p.123. 
33
 A. McIntyre, „Guilty Bystanders? On the Legitimacy of Duty to Rescue Statutes‟ (1994) 
23(2) Philosophy and Public Affairs 157, p. 159. 
34
 A. Norrie, Crime, Reason and History (Cambridge, CUP, 2001), p.123. 
35
 A. Ashworth, „The Scope of Criminal Liability for Omissions‟ (1989) 84 Law Quarterly 
Review 424. See also J. Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Volume 1: Harm to 
Others (Oxford: OUP, 1987), Ch 4. The idea that individual autonomy relies upon social co-
operation derives in turn from the work of Joseph Raz: J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom 
(Oxford: OUP, 1986). 
36
 A. Ashworth, „The Scope of Criminal Liability for Omissions‟ (1989) 84 Law Quarterly 
Review 424. 
37
 Suggesting once again at least a superficial coincidence between the feminist ethics of care 
and communitarian theory, from which the social responsibility view undoubtedly derives: S. 
Hekman, Moral Voices, Moral Selves: Carol Gilligan and Feminist Moral Theory (University 
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995). 
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the opposing values of individual autonomy and social responsibility? Neither 
the conventional or social responsibility viewpoint contends that care-giving in 
this context is anything other than commendable; their mutual focus is instead 
the extent to which it is appropriate to impose a duty of compulsory care-
giving.  What is more, a significant number of liberal legal commentators 
continue to advocate such criminal laws. In the following section I shall briefly 
outline why I think the ethics of care might indeed have something to offer 
here. Specifically, I contend that relational feminism thinking could support an 
alternative argument against criminalisation in this context, by challenging the 
underlying discursive parameters that have set the terms of the liberal debate. 
 
FEMINIST ANXIETIES: POWER, STIGMA AND COMPULSORY CARE 
 
Many feminists remain quite rightly cautious about the potential of law as a 
tool with which to alleviate the oppression of women.38 It is in this vein that I 
too approach the criminal law duty to rescue as a vehicle for the imposition of 
an ethics of care. Most obviously problematic, whether or not one concludes 
we owe a moral obligation toward strangers in need, is that criminalisation is 
unlikely to prove an effective way to inculcate this attitude in human beings. 
One might note, for instance, the recognition by Blum that altruistic feelings 
towards others cannot be imposed from above, but must be felt within the 
very soul of an individual.39 Such an observation, while undoubtedly correct, 
fails of course to consider the duty of easy rescue in light of the criminal law‟s 
own rationalities and objectives; the criminal law sets out not to govern the 
soul of the individual but merely to deter and punish wrongful behaviour. 
Nevertheless, even under these terms, the criminal law duty remains 
potentially troubling for relational feminism, and for rather different reasons to 
those provided by the conventional view. In short, the broad liberal 
jurisprudence within which the conventional and social responsibility views are 
located suffers from an impoverished conception of the realities of care-giving. 
 
Current jurisprudence presents the debate in terms of the competing interests 
of the individual and the community; its assumption is that the maximisation of 
individual autonomy is required to enable citizens to selfishly protect their own 
self-interest. The refusal to rescue the drowning stranger is categorised 
accordingly as the rejection of care-giving in favour of the pursuit of one‟s own 
goals. On this analysis, the immorality of the passer-by is undisputed by either 
side of the argument. However, one of the most valuable insights of the 
feminist ethics of care is the attention it draws to the complex networks of 
prior ties of kinship formed by individuals that are otherwise masked by liberal 
law‟s insistence upon the physical and existential separation of human beings. 
Might it be possible to conclude, in light of this novel viewpoint, that the 
refusal to rescue, rather than invariably the reaction of an individual selfishly 
pursuing his or her own interests, reflects instead their prioritisation (at the 
expense of the „drowning stranger‟) of prior obligations to those dependent 
upon them for their well-being? In other words, could recognition of prior 
networks of care-giving within which relational feminists argue we are 
                                                 
38
 C. Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (London: Routledge, 1989). 
39
 L. A. Blum, Friendship, Altruism, and Morality (London: Routledge, 1982). 
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inevitably located (though these relationships seem to be erased by current 
jurisprudential debates) alter our appraisal of their decision to walk on by? 
Take, for example, the claim often made that the imposition of a rescue duty 
would encourage an individual to risk his or her own safety in order to attempt 
a rescue the drowning stranger. In circumstances of possible danger is refusal 
to rescue inevitably an act of selfishness toward our fellow human beings? Or 
could it also sometimes be an act of selflessness, protecting oneself from 
harm in order to ensure we remain empowered to care for those we love and 
who depend upon us? Whatever the answer to that question, arguably the 
framing of the current jurisprudential debate prevents us from finding it. 
 
Such assertions are not in themselves particularly novel in the broader 
context of contemporary relational feminist scholarship. Commentators within 
the field have, in recent years, reassessed the implicit claim of earlier writers 
that justice and care are irreconcilable values. Some now argue instead that 
care-giving has to take place from a position of justice if it is to avoid 
disempowering both carer and dependant.40 Drawing from this insight, I would 
suggest that the criminal law‟s protection of the classic justice-based concept 
of freedom in the case of the duty of easy rescue, while potentially working to 
the detriment of the drowning stranger, may better serve an ethics of care by 
providing space beyond the disciplinary sphere for human beings to satisfy 
the demands placed upon them by prior ties of kinship and dependency. It is 
for this reason that relational feminist lawyers should perhaps remain wary of 
the general duty of easy rescue towards strangers, even though at first sight it 
might appear conducive to the promulgation of a societal ethics of care.  
 
Developing my analysis further, in this section I want to consider how the 
criminal law currently imposes compulsory care-giving,41 asking again what 
relational feminist theorising can contribute to our understanding of the 
gendered structuring of contemporary law and legal theory. To do so I return 
to the theoretical claims outlined earlier in this article about the association of 
the ethics of care with broader truths about women‟s lived experience. 
Specifically, I want to draw upon feminist concerns that, whether the 
association of women with interdependence, care and nurturing is presented 
as the product of biological essentialism or psychological conditioning, it tends 
to ensure that women who fail to match up to the standards of care-giving 
expected from their gender are stigmatised and punished. Further, it is 
important to consider the feminist observation that while women are 
disproportionately responsible for care-giving in society, too often patriarchal 
power ensures that this role has been imposed upon women rather than freely 
chosen by them. To paraphrase Sandra Bartky, feeding men's egos and 
tending men's wounds is intrinsically related to women‟s disempowerment.42 
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In short, authentic care cannot occur under conditions characterized by male 
domination and female subordination in which women are economically, 
socially or psychologically coerced into care-giving. 
 
These relational feminist insights inform the following analysis of the common 
law rules imposing omissions liability. Like the debates over the duty to easy 
rescue these rules are well-known to every law student. And most interesting 
among them in terms of their gendered implications, (and particularly the 
material impact for women) are the criminalisation of care-giving in the context 
of what the law deems „special relationships‟, together with liability accrued 
following „voluntary undertaking of responsibility‟ for another‟s welfare.43  
 
I want to use as my primary legal illustration, for the purpose of this section, 
another memorable staple of a law student‟s education in criminal law: the 
tragic case of Stone and Dobinson heard by the Court of Appeal in 1976.44 
The death from anorexia of the 61-year-old younger sister of the defendant 
Stone, surrounded by her own excrement and covered in bed sores, is an 
obvious point of reference for students of omissions liability. Stone and 
Dobinson, his female partner who lived with him in his home, were charged 
and convicted for gross negligence manslaughter.45 Part of the defendants‟ 
appeal rested upon the claimed absence of an omissions duty on the part of 
the two parties. It was confirmed that Stone‟s proximate blood relationship to 
his sister was enough to warrant such a duty. Dobinson, his partner, on the 
other hand, posed a more difficult challenge for the court: without a blood 
connection she did not have the necessary special relationship with the victim. 
Nevertheless, the court observed that during the time the victim had stayed 
with the couple Dobinson had provided her with food and other necessaries. 
This, the court concluded, was a voluntary undertaking of responsibility for the 
victim and an omissions duty had therefore existed. Both appeals were 
refused and the couple were sentenced to significant periods of imprisonment.  
 
One must remain wary, of course, when drawing conclusions from this case. 
Decided in the 1970s, and simply one brief encounter by the criminal process 
with (feminine) care-giving, one needs to be careful not to over-generalise its 
importance to our understanding of the criminal law‟s approach to care-giving. 
Yet I cannot help but find it incredible that the gendered implications of the 
case have not yet been submitted to even the most cursory of feminist re-
readings.46 For that reason, it forms the focal point of the following analysis. 
 
(a) “Special” relationships of care: judging motherhood 
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Perhaps the most well-established omission duties derive from the special set 
of obligations imposed by the criminal law upon particular human 
relationships.47 These status relationships are clearly signifiers of law‟s own 
hierarchy of the responsibilities human beings owe to one another. Intrinsic 
relationships of care-giving are those founded upon conjugality between 
spouses,48 the dependency of a child upon his or her parent49 and other 
proximate blood relationships.50 To a certain extent, this approach to 
compulsory care-giving must pose difficulties for some feminists. Considered 
against the backdrop of the refusal to impose duties towards strangers, these 
rules reinforce a traditional normative model of kinship and interdependency 
organised around conjugality and blood ties. In turn, they provide another 
reminder of the historic heteronormative preoccupations of the common law.  
 
On the other hand, one might expect relational feminists to support the 
significance given here to the care of children. Recognition of the value of the 
nurturing of the young, and the depth of the interrelationship between mother 
and child, is central to relational theories. As noted earlier, many such 
scholars derived their ethical framework from the practical reality of women‟s 
care-giving arising from their role as mothers. For instance, Martha Fineman 
proposes a normative hierarchy of care-giving that places the mother-child 
dyad at the heart of care.51 One might conclude, then, that at the very least 
the criminal law‟s claim about the intrinsic responsibilities of care-giving 
incumbent on a parent is indisputable from a feminist relational perspective. 
Yet what must still remain troubling for feminists in this context is the role of 
judgement intrinsic to a disciplinary, and materially punitive, system like the 
criminal law, and how invariably this judgement has gendered implications.  
 
Moral judgment by the legal system upon child-rearing is likely to affect 
women disproportionately because they remain predominantly responsible for 
the care of young people. One of the classic liberal arguments against 
omissions duties is that, unlike offences of action defined clearly in terms of 
the prohibited behaviour, the criminal law provides no guide to the steps 
required to satisfy their duties of care-giving.52 Yet there is unlikely to exist the 
same jurisprudential concern about lack of clarity in the context of parenting, 
as caring duties of parenthood tend to be presented as self-evident. More 
particularly, contemporary discourses tend to glorify motherhood.53 Society 
continues to shore up powerful standards upon women and this gives rise to 
the general concern that an ethics of care, when associated with women 
specifically, has dangerous implications. Indeed, this fear seems to be borne 
out by the recent spate of „failure to protect‟ statutes. The reality of many 
                                                 
47
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women‟s lived experiences, in which harm to children in contexts of domestic 
violence by violent male partners, seems to carry little weight in the face of an 
apparent expectation that mothers can and should do everything in their 
power to protect their children from harm.54 Moreover, the process of 
punishment of mothers in contexts of domestic violence also ensures 
discursive constructions that position mother and child in opposition to one 
another. In such circumstances, law fails to adequately recognise the extent 
to which punishment of the mother ultimately harms the child and that they 
are both the victims of the violence meted out most often by a man.55 
 
In light of these observations, the decision in Stone and Dobinson is perhaps 
revealing when considered again from a relational feminist perspective (as 
long as one remains aware of the provisos raised earlier about the 
contribution a single case can make to our conclusions about the care-giving 
experiences of women). Generally (and most obviously) what the decision 
seems to reinforce is the broader claim that women more often than not find 
themselves primary care-givers in domestic relationships. Though the victim 
was Stone‟s blood relative it was Dobinson who took on all care-giving 
responsibilities. There is the suggestion of even greater illustrative potential, 
however, when one considers the short paragraph, entirely ignored by the 
Court of Appeal itself in reaching its judgment on the case, in which the 
leading judge describing in passing Dobinson‟s interrogation by the police: 
 
When asked, “You are a woman and you go into the bedroom. Your own common 
sense would tell you that she needed attention?” She is said to have replied “She never 
complained so I didn‟t bother.”
56
 
 
The specific, explicit reference to Dobinson‟s sex, and the particular common 
sense of caring apparently available to her as a woman, provides a fleeting 
glimpse, perhaps, of deeper gendered conclusions about her conduct. In the 
context of care-giving there is seemingly nothing more damning than a 
woman‟s inability (or refusal) to satisfy the social expectations of her gender.  
 
(b) Voluntary undertaking of responsibility: of choice and coercion 
 
One might well conclude that the rule that an omissions duty will arise if a 
defendant has voluntarily undertaken responsibility for another provides a 
more attractive model for compulsory care-giving than the imposed status 
offences.  There are two components to the justification for criminal liability in 
this context. First, in undertaking responsibility for another you are identified 
as primary carer and, accordingly, others that might seek to take on caring 
responsibilities would be deterred from interfering in the welfare of the 
dependent individual. Second, the requirement of voluntariness appears to 
reflect again the prioritisation placed by the criminal law upon individual 
autonomy. Beyond the expectation of the law that you care for those within 
the (constructed) family unit, care is entirely in your gift, to be entered into in a 
quasi-contractual fashion. Drawing once more from my previous argument, 
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while responsibilities to others are subject, then, to the prior value of the 
individual, this could in fact be viewed as necessary, in certain circumstances, 
to enable the realisation of prior care-giving responsibilities. Rather than 
treating such an approach as an indication of a selfish legal order it might be 
seen instead to provide individuals with a space within which they can ensure 
that they satisfy their responsibilities to those dependent upon them. If one 
wishes to care for another then one should be able to take on that 
responsibility voluntarily, bringing oneself within the ambit of the criminal law.  
 
Yet I am also concerned by the broader implications of the notion of a 
voluntary undertaking of responsibility. Underpinning the interpretation of the 
duty as I have presented it here is a construction of care-giving that appears 
once again to be based upon a masculine model of care. Voluntary 
undertaking of responsibility for others as an ethical basis for criminal liability, 
because one has actively claimed a duty for another‟s care, assumes that 
individuals are empowered to negotiate these responsibilities freely. However, 
as noted above, the experience of womanhood promulgated by relational 
feminists asserts that connection is too often the result of economic, social or 
psychological coercion. Put another way, the notion of voluntary undertaking 
of responsibility fails to consider the possibility that care-giving might not 
always be freely negotiated (with all the implications carefully evaluated) from 
a position of separation and therefore power, but may be imposed when 
contexts and circumstances position individuals within relationships of care-
giving and dependency. One particular problem with such coercion is that 
individuals often find themselves subject to care-giving responsibilities that 
they are unable to effectively satisfy. More importantly, however, it is men who 
are usually most free to negotiate in and out of these relationships of care.  
 
My concern extends beyond the parenting role to all relationships in which 
one finds systemic coercion over the care-giving roles of individuals. For 
instance, a well-established basis for omissions liability, deriving from the 
broader liability arising from voluntary undertaking of responsibility, is the 
contract. Alan Norrie has suggested that the development of this contractual 
model reflected the need to find a basis for the increasing interconnectedness 
of capitalism in late nineteenth century England.57 But with capitalism comes 
also the role economic power plays in shaping the process of undertaking, 
again challenging the model of free negotiation of care-giving responsibilities 
(available to the white, middle class male) that the criminal law presumes. 
  
I want to return, finally, to the case of Stone and a further excerpt from the 
overlooked police interview with Mrs Dobinson. Once again, I am wary of 
drawing specific conclusions about the nature of law from this case. It involves 
one story, one particular era, and one particular woman. Yet what seems to 
peculiar to me is the absence of any consideration of the explicitly gendered 
implications of the context in which Dobinson‟s care-giving seems to have 
taken place. As the Court of Appeal noted: 
 
The appellant [Dobinson] said she kept telling Ted (the other appellant), but that he 
would not do anything. He just told her, “Leave it while tomorrow.” She was asked why 
                                                 
57
 A. Norrie, Crime Reason and History (Cambridge: CUP, 2001), p. 126. 
 14 
she did not get help and she replied, “I asked him to get a doctor. He said he had tried 
to, but because the deceased was not on his panel the doctor wouldn‟t come.” When 
asked why she did not speak to the lady next door or to Mrs. Wilson‟s daughter, who 
was a nurse, she is said to have replied, “I daren‟t. He is boss down there. I daren‟t do 
anything unless he tells me. She is not my sister, so I left it to him.”
58
 
 
This excerpt serves as an illustration of the reality that care-giving by women 
often takes place in the absence of the kind of empowerment predominantly 
experienced by men, and assumed by the notion of voluntary undertaking.  
 
Finally, the decision in Stone and Dobinson is useful for relational feminists 
beyond the insight it provides into women‟s experience of compulsory care-
giving because it suggests the rule on voluntary undertaking of responsibility 
potentially remains structurally gendered. As Alan Norrie has previously 
noted, closer consideration of the case suggests some problematic reasoning: 
 
The argument rests on a play on the concept of an undertaking. Dobinson had, as a 
matter of fact, „undertaken‟ certain actions on the deceased‟s behalf, but there was no 
evidence that she had made an undertaking to perform such tasks as she performed. 
There is a slide in the judgment between „undertaking‟ in a practical and in a 
„contractual‟ sense.
59
 
 
Norrie argues that the concept of undertaking was deliberately “manipulated 
into action” in this way by the judges of the Court, who appreciated “they had 
no real basis in law for establishing a duty to act in the case of [the] 
defendant”,60 in order to ensure a conviction in the face of the harrowing death 
of the victim. However, from a relational feminist perspective I want to pose a 
further alternative interpretation of this apparent slippage in meaning. Could it 
be said instead that the judges of the Court, acculturated themselves 
according to a masculine vision of empowered negotiation of care-giving 
responsibilities, actually believed that evidence of Dobinson‟s practical care-
giving presupposed that her responsibility was voluntarily undertaken? If so, it 
is perhaps time the reality of coercive care-giving (not just among women) 
was confronted explicitly within the rules on criminal liability for omissions. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Relational feminist jurisprudence is increasingly shunned in a postmodern era 
characterised by a refusal to accept universal subjectivities for women (or any 
other identity category for that matter). However, if one is sensitive to these 
criticisms, it still continues to provide in my view valuable new perspectives on 
patriarchal jurisprudence, as the basis for a persuasive feminist ethical 
framework. In the context of legal studies in particular, the ethics of care 
provides a significant jurisprudential counterpoint to the prioritisation of 
individual autonomy within the contemporary legal order, in its recognition that 
none of us can claim to be wholly separate from other human beings, 
positioned as we are within complex prior networks of care-giving and 
dependency. This simple observation has important implications for our 
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understanding of law‟s patriarchal ancestry and possible visions for its future, 
as I hope this reconsideration of the rules of omissions liability has shown.  
 
The central thesis of this article, drawing upon the insights of relational 
feminism, was a tentative critique of both the jurisprudence and legal rules 
that govern our thinking about criminal omissions liability. As a further final 
observation, however, I should also add that references throughout to the 
formative role of the concept of criminal omissions in an undergraduate 
student‟s legal education were also deliberate. The „drowning stranger‟, the 
special status relationships, the notion of a voluntary undertaking of 
responsibility and the case of Stone and Dobinson are more than simply the 
stuff of academic research. They also contribute significantly to lawyers‟ own 
ethical development and comprehension of the transformative role of law. 
Accordingly, the constructions of care-giving that I have suggested could arise 
from the law in this area, from the masculine anxieties of annihilation by the 
other, and the pervasive assumptions about the realities of care-giving from a 
clearly male viewpoint, have the power to shore up patriarchal jurisprudence. 
Omissions liability as an educational tool would benefit immensely, I would 
therefore contend, from reconsideration through the lens of the ethics of care. 
 
*** 
